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Tennessee v. Lane: Winning the Battle, Losing the War?
Michael Foreman' & Ossai Miazad
Good afternoon. I am very happy to be here. I
want to thank the dean, and Richard, I want to thank the
JOURNAL for hosting this symposium. I feel like the last
hitter in a long program with a lot of heavy hitters. It is
very difficult to do the follow-up. I am going to steal one
of Mr. Lane's mottos here, his K.I.S.S. theory, but I am
going to change it to "Keep It Short, Stupid." I will attempt
to keep it short.
For some of you who know of the Lawyer's
Committee, you may be asking why we are here. For those
of you who do not know of the Lawyer's Committee, I will
explain. The Committee was founded in 1963. We litigate
primarily race discrimination and sex discrimination class
actions across the country. While we do not have many
cases dealing with disability discrimination, the Lawyer's
Committee is concerned about the erosion of Congress'
power to legislate in the area of discrimination. The
Committee has been involved in many of the sentinel cases
dealing with discrimination. We filed an amicus brief in
the Lane2 case on behalf of NAACP lawyers. We were
also involved in the Boerne3 case. Our goal was to put a
stake in the ground so the court did not bleed over into the
sex discrimination area or possibly the race discrimination
area using the same theory. That is the victory in Lane is
important to us.
When Ms. Jones started the day, she summed up the
issue in front of you-you cannot sue the State. It has
1 Mr. Foreman serves as deputy director for legal programs at the
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under Law. He is a frequent
speaker on civil rights issues and has served as counsel of record for the
Lawyer's Committee in several cases before the Supreme Court.
2 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
3 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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sovereign immunity. I think her quote was something like
you cannot sue "the high and mighty."
I want to talk about what Lane is about in the big
perspective. This case represents a constitutional struggle
between the federal government's ability to regulate versus
the State's claim that they are sovereign and have the
power to act alone.
Since we are in a law school, I think we should do a
law school exercise. I am going to state a couple
principles. You will accept these principles, and then we
will decide the Lane case based on these principles. After
that, we will determine what it means for the future.
1. That the civil war amendments were passed to
take power away from the state and give it to the federal
government is not in debate. It has been the law for
centuries.
2. That Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is
an affirmative grant of power to the federal government to
regulate the states. That is not in debate.
The debate is centered on the standard used to shift
power. Chief Justice Marshall expressed his standard by
stating, "Let the end be legitimate and all means are
appropriate." This sentiment was the beginning of what we
call the "rational means" test. The test asks "are Congress'
actions a rational means to accomplish its goals?" For
almost two centuries, the rational means test had been the
law. A more modem example of this rational means test
can be found in Katzenbach.4 In 1966, the Supreme Court
held that the legislative choice is not subject to courtroom
fact-finding and may be based on a rational speculation,
again as long as what Congress does is by rational means.
Now if you take that constitutional test and apply it
to the Lane situation, is what Congress did rational? I think
almost everybody has to come to the conclusion that it is
rational.
4 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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So why is that not the end of the case? Because in
1997 the Court adopted a "congruence in proportionality"
test. What does that mean? We talked about some of the
cases-City of Boerne, Kimel,5 and Garrett.6 These cases
held that there needs to be a very close match between what
is in the legislative record and how Congress chooses to
regulate it.
What does that do? It has the courts examining the
legislative record.
I believe there are a lot of things wrong with the
"congruence of proportionality." Unfortunately, it is clear
from the current jurisprudence that this Court is not going
to move away from it. So we are trying to convince the
Court that when they say "congruence in proportionality,"
what they really mean is "rational means." We need to
because the new test ignores how Congress works.
Congress is not a courtroom; it is not a factfinder. For any
of you who have done legislative work, it resembles a
sausage factory. You do not want to see what goes in there
and probably cannot imagine what goes into it. So, trying
to look at the record and come up with a coherent pattern is
really tying Congress' hands in two ways.
One way is to justify statutes that have already been
passed, which the solicitor's office is going to have to fight
continually. It limits Congress in what they can do in
future legislation, like in areas of sexual orientation or other
areas of controversial legislation. Second, determine what
kind of record Congress has to adopt to move into
controversial areas. It is virtually impossible for them to
adopt this test.
Where does Tennessee v. Lane fit in this?
Obviously it is a victory for Ms. Jones, Mr. Lane, and Mr.
Brown. I think it is a tremendous victory to get the Court
5 Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
6 Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001).
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to use the "as applied" test. The Plaintiffs took an
extremely hard case against an extremely hard
jurisprudence and won it.
Where does Lane fit in the larger constitutional
area? For us, it is another step along the way that the Court
here said, "Yes, as applied here, it is constitutional."
Why was it constitutional? Because we are dealing
with one of the most fundamental rights we have, the
access to courts.
What does this case say about the hockey rink or the
ice skating rink? We are not sure and that will be the
problem with the case moving forward. It guarantees each
and every one of these issues will continue to be litigated.
There was a comment made earlier, I think it was
by Mr. Lane, that we are taking a ton of money and putting
it in litigation and defending it. We could take a lot of
money and put it in disability rights issues and solve these
issues. It is not a hypothetical concern, and given our time
I will quickly move through this. Right now the courts are
grappling with it. You used the example of a skating rink.
I am not sure a skating rink will survive the same
constitutional challenge that we did here.
Recently, in the case of Association for Disabled
Americans v. Florida International University,7 the
Eleventh Circuit Court said education did survive the test,
and that it was different from other rights that are only
subject to rational review. Again, focusing on either
classifications like race or sex, they are subjected to a
higher level of scrutiny or a fundamental right. But in
Cochran v. Pinchak,8 the Third Circuit held that a disabled
prisoner was not denied a fundamental right when he was
not allowed access to books, a talking watch, and a usable
7 405 F.3d 954 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
" 401 F.3d 184 (3rd Cir. 2005). Note, after this symposium, rehearing
was granted and the judgment vacated. See 412 F.3d 500 (3rd Cir.
2005).
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walking cane. Therefore, the Tennessee v. Lane analysis
did not apply.
The Fourth Circuit in 2004, in another claim by a
prisoner that he was not provided with timely refills of his
prescriptions, went to the Lane decision. 9 The quote was,
"it appears that the actual holding [in Lane] is fairly narrow
and is limited to the class of cases implicating the
fundamental right of access to the courts."'  A district
court case took the opposite view in education and said the
right to education was not a fundamental right. Another
case, out of the Southern District of New York, held that a
person with disability seeking admission to the bar did not
pose a challenge implicating a fundamental right, and
therefore, Tennessee v. Lane did not apply. So what we are
left with is unfortunately litigating a lot of these issues on a
case by case basis unless the Supreme Court can somehow
be pushed back into some rational means of review where
they are not second guessing the wisdom of Congress.
Unfortunately, given today's climate and where we
are going, I do not see it happening. I would hope that the
states decide, rather than putting the money into the
litigation of these cases, to put it into improving
accessibility. The need for these cases would hopefully
evaporate as we move forward. Thank you very much.
9 See Spencer v. Easter, 109 Fed. Appx. 571 (Va. 2004).
101d. at 573.
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